We study information flow security properties which are persistent, in the sense that if a system is secure then all of its reachable states are secure too. We present a uniform characterization of these properties in terms of a general unwinding schema. This unwinding characterization allows us to prove several compositionality properties of the considered security classes. Moreover, we exploit the unwinding condition to dictate the form of the rules we can use to incrementally develop secure processes and to rectify insecure processes.
Introduction
Information flow security properties have been proposed as a means to ensure confidentiality of classified information in multilevel systems. These properties impose constraints on information flow among different groups of entities with different security levels. Often only two groups are considered and are labelled with the security levels high (H) and low (L). The condition is that no information should flow from H to L. This work has been partially supported by MIUR project "Modelli formali per la sicurezza", the EU project MyThS (IST-2001-32617) and the FIRB project (RBAU018RCZ) "Interpretazione astratta e model checking per la verifica di sistemi embedded". The necessity of controlling information flow as a whole (both direct and indirect) motivated Goguen and Meseguer in introducing the notion of Noninterference [19, 20] . Non-Interference formalizes the absence of information flow within deterministic systems. Given a system in which confidential (i.e., high level) and public (i.e., low level) information may coexist, non-interference requires that confidential inputs never affect the outputs on the public interface of the system, i.e., never interfere with the low level users. If such a property holds, one can conclude that no information flow is ever possible from high to low level.
Starting from Sutherland [36] , many definitions extending the concept of non-interference to non-deterministic systems have been proposed in the literature. They are developed in different settings such as programming languages [4, 33, 34, 35] , trace models [25, 26] , process calculi [11, 14, 22, 30, 31, 32] , probabilistic models [2, 12] , timed models [15, 21] , cryptographic protocols [1, 5, 16] .
In [13] , Focardi and Gorrieri express the concept of non-interference in the Security Process Algebra (SPA) language, in terms of bisimulation semantics. In particular, inspired by [37] , they introduce the notion of Bisimulationbased non Deducibility on Compositions (BNDC ): a system E is BNDC if what a low level user sees of the system is not modified (in the sense of the bisimulation semantics) by composing any high level process Π with E. The main advantage of BNDC with respect to trace-based properties is that it is powerful enough to detect information flows due to the possibility, for a high level malicious process, to block or unblock a system. In particular, in [13, 14] , it is shown that a malicious process may build a channel from high to low, by suitably blocking and unblocking some system services accessible by low level users. The system used to build this covert channel turns out to be secure with respect to trace-based properties. This motivates the use of more discriminating equivalences such as bisimulation.
Although Martinelli [24] has shown that a class of BNDC -like properties is decidable over finite state processes, the problem of efficiently verifying BNDC is still open. Indeed, decidability of BNDC is an open problem. The main difficulty consists of getting rid of the universal quantification on high level processes Π. Another drawback of BNDC is that it is not compositional with respect to the main SPA operators, such as the parallel composition and the nondeterministic choice. Compositionality results are useful since they help in designing efficient verification algorithms and in defining proof systems which allow one to incrementally build systems which are secure by construction.
For these reasons many decidable and compositional sufficient conditions for BNDC have been studied in the literature. In [9] it has been proved that four of these sufficient conditions, namely Persistent BNDC (P BNDC ), Strong BNDC (SBNDC ), Compositional P BNDC (CP BNDC ), and Progressing P BNDC (PP BNDC ), can be characterized in terms of unwinding conditions.
Unwinding conditions demand properties of individual actions: they aim at "distilling" the local effect of performing high level actions. As observed by many authors (see [31, 29, 23, 32] ) they are easier to handle and more amenable to automated proof with respect to global conditions.
In this paper we bridge the gap between unwinding conditions and compositionality. In particular, we introduce a parametric notion of unwinding which generalizes the unwinding characterizations considered in [9] . We exploit the parametric unwinding condition to formulate general compositionality results. Such results aim at establishing a link between the semantics of the operator with respect to which we want to ensure compositionality and the relations involved in the unwinding condition. The compositionality properties of P BNDC, SBNDC, CP BNDC, and PP BNDC are just special instances of our general results. In the same spirit, we analize how to preserve unwinding conditions under refinement (see [8] ). By exploiting the parametric unwinding condition and its general compositionality properties, we can also define proof systems (see [7] ) which allow us to build processes which are secure by construction. Finally we suggest methods to rectify (see [6] ) insecure processes in order to obtain processes which satisfy the unwinding conditions characterizing specific security properties.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the syntax and the semantics of the SPA language. In Section 3 we introduce the security properties BNDC and P BNDC. Moreover, in Section 3.1 we define a general unwinding schema and give a uniform presentation of the security properties P BNDC, SBNDC, CP BNDC, and PP BNDC as different instances of the general schema. In Section 4 we analize the relationships between unwinding conditions and compositionality with respect to the SPA operators and refinement. We exploit these results to develop proof systems for properties characterized through unwinding. In Section 5 we exploit the general unwinding schema to present a method for rectifying insecure processes. Finally, in Section 6 we draw some conclusions. This paper surveys previous work by the authors [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] . The above mentioned general framework is an original contribution which allows us to uniformly present our results and also to generalize some of them.
Preliminaries
In this section we report the syntax and semantics of the process algebra we consider. It is a variation of Milner's CCS [27] , similar to the Security Process Algebra (SPA, for short) language [14] , where the set of visible actions is partitioned into high level actions and low level ones in order to specify multilevel systems. In addition to constant definitions, we allow one to use the replication (!) operator for defining recursive systems.
The syntax of our process algebra is based on the same elements as CCS that is: a set L of visible actions such that L = I ∪ O where I = {a, b, . . .} is a set of input actions and O = {ā,b, . . .} is a set of output actions; a special action τ which models internal computations, i.e., not visible outside the system; a complementation function· : L → L, such thatā = a, for all a ∈ L. Act = L ∪ {τ } is the set of all actions. The set of visible actions is partitioned into two sets, H and L, of high and low actions such that H = H and L = L.
The syntax of SPA terms 6 (or processes) is defined as follows:
and Z is a constant that must be associated with a definition Z def = E. Intuitively, 0 is the empty process that does nothing; a.E is a process that can perform an action a and then behaves as E; E 1 + E 2 represents the nondeterministic choice between the two processes E 1 and E 2 ; E 1 |E 2 is the parallel composition of E 1 and E 2 , where executions are interleaved, possibly synchronized on complementary input/output actions, producing an internal action τ ; E \ v is a process E prevented from performing actions in v; E[f ] is the process E whose actions are renamed via the relabelling function f ; !E (bang E) is the process E|E| . . ., i.e., the parallel composition of as many copy as needed of the process E.
We say that a process E is guarded if it can be built by using the rule a.E + a.E instead of E + E in the syntax of SPA terms above.
We denote by E the set of all SPA processes and by E H the set of all high level processes, i.e., those constructed only using actions in H ∪ {τ }.
The operational semantics of SPA agents is given in terms of Labelled Transition Systems (LTS, for short). A LTS is a triple (S, A, →) where S is a set of states, A is a set of labels (actions), →⊆ S × A × S is a set of labelled transitions. The notation (S 1 , a, S 2 ) ∈→ (or equivalently S 1 a → S 2 ) means that the system can move from the state S 1 to the state S 2 through the action a. The operational semantics of SPA is the LTS (E, Act , →), where the states are the terms of the algebra and the transition relation →⊆ E × Act × E is defined by structural induction as the least relation generated by the inference rules depicted in Figure 1 . We use also the notion of rooted labelled transition system which is a LTS augmented with a distinguish node, the root. Given a process E we denote by LT S(E) = (S E , E, Act , →) the rooted LTS constituted of the subpart of the SPA LTS reachable from E. E is a finite-state process if LT S(E) has a finite number of nodes, that is S E is finite.
The concept of observation equivalence is used to establish equalities among processes and it is based on the idea that two systems have the same semantics if and only if they cannot be distinguished by an external observer. This is obtained by defining an equivalence relation over E. The strong bisimulation relation [27] equates two processes if they are able to mutually simulate their behavior step by step.
We will use the following auxiliary notations. Act * denotes the set of (possibly empty) sequences of actions, while Act + denotes the set of nonempty sequences of actions. If t = a 1 · · · a n ∈ Act * and E
* denotes a (possibly empty) sequence of τ labelled transitions. If t ∈ Act * , thent ∈ L * is the sequence gained by deleting all occurrences of τ from t. As a consequence, Eâ =⇒ E stands for E a =⇒ E if a ∈ L, and for E(
τ =⇒ requires at least one τ labelled transition whileτ =⇒ means zero or more τ labelled transitions). We say that E is reachable from E when there exists t ∈ Act * such that E t → E . We denote by Reach(E) the set of all sates reachable from E.
The notion of strong bisimulation can be defined through the simulation preorder as follows.
Definition 2.1 [Simulation]
A binary relation R ⊆ E × E over agents is a simulation if (E, F ) ∈ R implies, for all a ∈ Act ,
An agent E is simulated by another agent F , denoted by E ≤ F , if there exists a simulation R containing the pair (E, F ).
The relation ≤ is the largest simulation and it is a preorder relation, i.e., it is reflexive and transitive. The relation ∼ B is the largest strong bisimulation and it is an equivalence relation.
In many applications strong bisimulation is too demanding, i.e., it is too fine. In particular, the internal transitions are treated as all the other actions. The weak bisimulation relation is similar to strong bisimulation, but it does not care about internal τ actions.
Definition 2.3 [Weak Bisimulation]
A binary relation R ⊆ E ×E over agents is a weak bisimulation if (E, F ) ∈ R implies, for all a ∈ Act ,
• if E a → E , then there exists F such that Fâ =⇒ F and (E , F ) ∈ R;
• if F a → F , then there exists E such that Eâ =⇒ E and (E , F ) ∈ R.
Two agents E, F ∈ E are weakly bisimilar, denoted by E ≈ B F , if there exists a weak bisimulation R containing the pair (E, F ).
The relation ≈ B is the largest weak bisimulation and it is an equivalence relation [27] .
In our security properties we need the notions of weak bisimulation on low actions, which equates processes which are bisimilar from the low level user point of view, and progressing bisimulation on low actions, which also requires that each τ action is simulated by at least one τ .
Definition 2.4 [Weak Bisimulation on Low Actions] A binary relation R ⊆ E × E over agents is a weak bisimulation on low actions
• if E → E , then there exists F such that Fˆ =⇒ F and (E , F ) ∈ R;
• if F → F , then there exists E such that Eˆ =⇒ E and (E , F ) ∈ R.
Two agents E, F ∈ E are weakly bisimilar on low actions, denoted by E ≈ l B F , if there exists a weak bisimulation R containing the pair (E, F ).
It is immediate to prove that
Progressing bisimulation on low actions is similar to weak bisimulation on low actions, but it is based on the notion of progressing bisimulation introduced in [28] .
Definition 2.5 [Progressing Bisimulation on Low Actions] A binary relation
R ⊆ E × E over agents is a progressing bisimulation on low actions if (E, F ) ∈ R implies, for all ∈ L ∪ {τ },
• if E → E , then there exists F such that F =⇒ F and (E , F ) ∈ R;
• if F → F , then there exists E such that E =⇒ E and (E , F ) ∈ R.
Two agents E, F are progressing bisimilar on low actions, denoted by E ≈ l P F , if there exists a weak bisimulation R containing the pair (E, F ). 
Bisimulation Based Security Properties
In [13] , Focardi and Gorrieri express the concept of non-interference in terms of bisimulation semantics through the notion of Bisimulation-based non Deducibility on Compositions (BNDC ). Property BNDC is based on the idea of checking the system against all high level potential interactions, representing every possible high level malicious program. In particular, a system E is BNDC if for every high level process Π a low level user cannot distinguish E from (E|Π), i.e., if Π cannot interfere with the low level execution of the system E. In other words, a system E is BNDC if what a low level user sees of the system is not modified by composing any high level process Π to E.
Example 3.2 Let us consider an abstract specification M x of a binary memory cell. M x contains the binary value x and is accessible, by high and low users, through the four operations r h , w h , r l , w l representing a high read, a high write, a low read and a low write, respectively. Each operation is implemented through two different actions, one for each binary value. For example w h 0 and w h 1 indicate a high level user writing value 0 and 1, respectively. 7 The LTS of process M x is depicted in Figure 2 .
Notice that read (write) operations are modelled as outputs (inputs). Process M x can send the stored value x through the two output actions r h x and r l x. Moreover, write operations are performed by accepting an input w h y and w l y (with y ∈ {0, 1}) and moving to M y, i.e., storing y into the memory cell.
Notice that M 0 and M 1 are totally insecure processes. As a matter of fact, a high level user may use the memory cell to directly send confidential information to the low level. Using BNDC we detect that M 0 and M 1 are insecure. In fact, considering the process Π ≡ w h 1.0 we get that (M 0 |Π)\H ≡ τ.M 1 \ H which is not weak bisimilar to M 0 \ H, since in τ.M 1 \ H the low level user reads 1, while in M 0 \ H he reads 0.
In [14] , Focardi and Gorrieri observe that the BNDC property is difficult to use in practice: its decidability is still an open problem. It would be desirable to have an alternative formulation of BNDC which avoids the universal quantification on high level processes and exploits local information only. One of the main difficulty in finding such an alternative characterization comes from the fact that BNDC is not persistent and thus the requirements on the processes reachable from a BNDC process E should be different from the requirements on E itself. In [17] , it is introduced a security property called Persistent BNDC (P BNDC, for short), in which persistence is imposed by definition.
The decidability of P BNDC over finite state processes has been proved in [17] by exploiting a bisimulation based characterization.
A standard way to protect confidential data is to apply the multilevel security model of [3] . First, we need to assign a security level to any information containers (called objects); then the following access control rules are imposed: (i) no low level user can read from high level objects; (ii) no high user can write into low level objects. Indeed, these are the only two (direct) ways for leaking confidential information. Sometimes they are sufficient to ensure security as described in the following example.
Example 3.4
The memory cell of Example 3.2 is neither BNDC nor P BNDC.
In order to protect confidential data we can transform M x into both a high level cell M h x (see Figure 3 ), by eliminating any low level read operation (rule (i) above),
and a low level cell M l x, by eliminating any high level write operation (rule (ii) above): 
We can prove that both M h x and M l x are P BNDC.
Other bisimulation based persistent security properties have been studied in the literature. We recall here the following: Strong BNDC (SBNDC, for short), introduced in [13] , Compositional P BNDC (CP BNDC, for short), introduced in [8] , and Progressing P BNDC (PP BNDC, for short), introduced in [9] . All these properties are included in the BNDC class, i.e., if a process satisfies one of them, then it is BNDC. In the next subsection we introduce them through a uniform unwinding definition.
Unwinding Definitions
The idea behind the notion of unwinding is to introduce some constraints on the transitions of the system (see [32] ) which imply some global properties. In particular, when an unwinding condition is used to define a non-interference property it usually requires that each high level action can be "simulated" in such a way that it is impossible for the low level user to infer which high level actions have been performed (see [29] ).
In this section we give a uniform presentation of the security properties P BNDC, SBNDC, CP BNDC, and PP BNDC by introducing a generalized unwinding condition. Our unwinding is parametric with respect to two binary relations on processes: an equivalence relation, l , which represents the low level indistinguishability and a transition relation, , which characterizes the local connectivity required by the unwinding condition.
Definition 3.5 [Generalized Unwinding] Let
l be a binary equivalence relation on E and be a binary relation on E. We define the unwinding class
The unwinding condition characterizing an unwinding class clearly implies persistence. Moreover, any process E which does not perform high level actions belongs to any unwinding class W( l , ), since the unwinding condition is trivially satisfied.
The following theorem follows from the unwinding characterizations of P BNDC studied in [7] and of PP BNDC studied in [9] , and from the original definitions of SBNDC in [13] and of CP BNDC in [8] .
Theorem 3.6 (Unwinding) Let E ∈ E be a process.
where ≡ is the syntactic equality between processes.
The above theorem helps us to understand the local meaning of our security properties. Let F be a process reachable from a P BNDC process E. If F can perform a high level transition reaching a process G, then F can also simulate such a move reaching, through a (possible empty) sequence of silent transitions, a process G which is undistinguishable from G from a low level view. In the case of SBNDC the sequence of silent transitions is replaced by no transitions, i.e., G is F itself, while in the case of CP BNDC and PP BNDC the silent sequence cannot be empty. Moreover, in PP BNDC weak bisimulation on low actions is replaced by progressing bisimulation on low actions.
Example 3.7
Consider the memory cells M h x and M l x described in Example 3.4. Exploiting the unwinding characterization of P BNDC given in Theorem 3.6 it is easy to see that both M h 0 and M h 1 are P BNDC . First, notice that M h 0 ≈ l B M h 1, since there is no way for a low level user to distinguish between the two states. As a matter of fact, the only possible low level actions are the two write operations w l 0, w l 1 which, both in M h 0 and in M h 1, move the system into the same states. The fact that M l 0 and M l 1 are P BNDC is even easier to prove: the only high level actions r h 0, r h 1 do not change the system state. Moreover, since neither M h x nor M l x perform any τ transition, one can infer that they are also SBNDC. Finally, one can notice that M h x and M l x are neither CP BNDC nor PP BNDC, since there are not τ moves executable by the two processes.
Consider now the processes N h x (see Figure 4) and N l x obtained by adding a time-out realized by a τ -loop in the initial state of both M h x and M l x, i.e.,
The processes N h x and N l x are both CP BNDC and PP BNDC.
The unwinding characterizations allow us to easily prove that PP BNDC ⊂ CP BNDC ⊂ P BNDC, SBNDC ⊂ P BNDC, and the processes containing only low level actions satisfy all of them. The situation is summarized in Figure 5 .
How to Incrementally Build Secure Processes
Compositionality is useful for both verification and synthesis. On one hand, if a property is preserved when systems are composed, then the analysis process can be decomposed and applied to subsystems in order to prove that the system as a whole satisfies the desired property. On the other hand, in the synthesis of a system, compositionality makes it possible to deal with all the subcomponents in a uniform way. In this section we analyze the relations between the unwinding conditions and compositionality results. We show that all the security properties we considered are compositional with respect to the parallel operator, while not all of them are fully compositional. In particular, P BNDC and SBNDC are not preserved by the nondeterministic choice operator. In general, when we build a system that may (nondeterministically) choose to behave as one of two secure subsystems, we could obtain an insecure system. As also observed in [18] , this seems to be counterintuitive. On the contrary, PP BNDC and CP BNDC are fully compositional, i.e., they are compositional also with respect to the nondeterministic choice.
Besides standard algebra operators, we also consider refinement operators which are useful for the stepwise development of secure processes. Indeed, one usually starts from a very abstract specification of the desired system which is then refined and decomposed until one arrives at a concrete specification that can directly be implemented. If properties are preserved under each refinement step then those properties which have been already investigated in some phase need not to be re-investigated in later phases.
Given an unwinding class W(∼ l , ) and a partial function f :
To study compositionality properties of unwinding classes we first introduce the following notions of preservation and reflection.
Definition 4.1 [Preservation and Reflection] Let f : E
k −→ E be a partial function and ⊆ E × E be a relation. The function f preserves if the following condition holds. Let I J be any partition of {1, . . . , k} with I = ∅. If ∀i ∈ I (G i G i ) and ∀j ∈ J (G j ≡ G j ) then
The function f reflects if the following condition holds. If f (G 1 , . . . , G k ) M, then ∃ I, J, I J = {1, . . . , k} and I = ∅ such that
The condition I = ∅ in the above definition has the aim of considering also non reflexive relations, e.g. the relation h →.
Example 4.2 Let be the weak bisimulation relation, i.e., E F if and only if E ≈ B F . It holds that the parallel composition operator preserves weak bisimulation [27] . On the other hand, the nondetermistic choice operator does not preserve weak bisimulation. In fact, 0 ≈ B τ.0, but a.0 + 0 ≈ B a.0 + τ.0.
Let be the reachability relation, i.e., {(E, F ) | E ∈ E and F ∈ Reach(E)}. The parallel operator reflects . In fact, if
Compositionality of an unwinding class can be proved by means of the following theorem. 
Proof.
It is not restrictive to assume k = 2. Let E, F ∈ W(∼ l , ). We have to prove that f (E, F ) ∈ W(∼ l , ). If f (E, F ) reaches M, then, since f reflects the reachability relation 8 , there exist G, K (one of them possibly equal to E or F , respectively) such that E reaches G, F reaches K, and M ≡ f (G, K). If M h → M , then, since f reflects h →, three cases are possible:
In the first case G G and G ∼ l G . Hence, since f preserves and
The second and the third cases are similar. Hence, f (E, F ) ∈ W(∼ l , ).
2
As we will see in the next subsection, the hypotheses of the above theorem are satisfied when we deal with operators whose semantics is recursively defined on subprocesses (e.g., the parallel operator |). Other operators have a semantics which is a "union" of the semantics of subprocesses (e.g., the nondeterministic choice operator). To deal with such kind of operators we introduce the notions of propagation and projection. G i ), then f (G 1 , . . . , G k ) G i or f (G 1 , . . . , G k ) ↑. The function f projects if the following condition holds . If f (G 1 , . . . , G k ) M, then ∃i such that G i M. 
We say that a process E positively reaches a process E if there exists a process E and an action a such that E a → E and E reaches E . 
Proof.
It is not restrictive to assume k = 2. Let E, F ∈ W(∼ l , ). We have to prove that f (E, F ) ∈ W(∼ l , ). If f (E, F ) reaches M, then, two cases are possible:
In the first case we have to prove that if
From the fact that f propagates we get that f (E, F ) M , i.e., the thesis.
In the second case, since f projects the positive reachability relation, we can safely assume that E reaches M. Since E ∈ W(∼ l , ) and E reaches M, we immediately get the thesis. 2 2
Compositionality with respect to the Algebra Operators
The following result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.3, since all the operators it deals with reflect h → and the reachability relation. •
) is compositional with respect to the v-restriction;
• Let g be a renaming. If the function ren g :
) is compositional with respect to the g-renaming;
• If the function par :
) is compositional with respect to the parallel composition |;
• If the function def :
) is compositional with respect to the constant definition
The following result is a consequence of Theorem 4.6, since the nondeterministic choice operator projects 
) is compositional with with respect to the nondeterministic choice operator +.
Theorem 4.9 (Low Prefix)
) be an unwinding class of process. If l ∈ L is a low level action, then W(∼ l , ) is compositional with respect to the low prefix operator which maps E into l.E.
Proof. We have to prove that if
). If l.E reaches E , then two cases are possible:
• E ≡ l.E;
• E ∈ Reach(E).
In the first case E cannot perform any high level action, hence we have nothing to prove. In the second case by the hypothesis that E ∈ W(∼ l , ) we immediately get the thesis.
2
The replication operator needs an ad-hoc theorem since it does not reflects h → and the reachability relation. In fact, if !E reaches E this does not correspond to the fact that E reaches E and E ≡!E . In particular, if !E reaches E we can prove that E is of the form E 1 | . . . |E n |!E where all the E i 's are reached by E. The following theorem allows us to exploit this form of 'reflection' of the reachability relation to obtain sufficient conditions for the compositionality with respect to the replication operator. (1) is included in the reachability relation, i.e., if E F then E reaches F ,
) is compositional with respect to the replication operator !.
Proof. First we prove the following claim. Claim 1. If !F reaches F , then there exist n ≥ 0 and F 1 , . . . , F n such that F reaches F i , for i = 1, . . . , n and
We proceed by induction on the length ln of t.
If ln = 0, then F ≡!F , hence we have the thesis with n = 0. Let us assume that we have proved the thesis for all the ln ≤ m. Let ln = m + 1. This means that there exists F such that !F t → F , t has length m, and F a → F . By inductive hypothesis there exist n ≥ 0 and F 1 , . . . , F n such that F reaches F i , for i = 1, . . . , n and F ≡ F 1 |F 2 | . . . |F n |!F. If the action a is performed by one of the F i 's, say F 1 , we have the thesis, since F reaches
Similarly we obtain the thesis if a = τ is a synchronization between two of the F i 's. If the action a is performed by !F applying the first rule of Replication, then F a → F n+1 and
Similarly we obtain the thesis in the remaining two cases, i.e. if a is performed by !F applying the second rule of Replication or if a is a synchronization between one of the F i 's and !F . Now we have to prove that if
, we have that F K and K ∼ l G . By hypothesis (4), !F K|!F . Moreover, by hypothesis (1), we have that K ∈ W(∼ l , ), hence since, by hypothesis (2), f
→ G, then two cases are possible:
• there exists i such that
In the first case, since
Since, by hypotheses (3) and (2), g n+1 preserves and f
Hence, by hypothesis (4), we get that !F K|!F . Since, by hypothesis (3), g n+1 preserves we have that
, hence we can exploit the fact that f
We are now ready to apply our general results to the security properties P BNDC, SBNDC, CP BNDC, and PP BNDC. • the l-prefix operator, for each l ∈ L;
• the v-restriction operator, for each v ⊆ L;
• the g-renaming operator, for each renaming g;
• the parallel composition |;
• the constant definition def = ;
• the replication operator !.
CP BNDC, PP BNDC are compositional with respect to the nondeterministic choice operator +.
Proof. As far as the first 5 operators are concerned, the compositionality can be proved by observing that the hypothesis of Theorem 4.9 and Corollary 4.7 hold.
To prove the compositionality with respect to the replication operator we need to prove that the hypothesis of Theorem 4.10 hold.
(1) The relations (
+ are included in the reachability. (2) We prove that the f F k 's preserve ∼ l . In the case of P BNDC the fact that each f 
is a weak bisimulation on low actions (see Lemma 5 of [10] ). In the case of SBNDC and CP BNDC the thesis follows from the case of P BNDC, since they are both included in P BNDC and they use ≈ l B , as P BNDC does. In the case of PP BNDC the proof can be obtained similarly by proving that
is a progressing bisimulation on low actions.
(3) The fact that each g k preserves (
+ is a consequence of the semantics of the parallel operator.
(4) Also the last hypothesis, i.e., F F implies !F F |!F , can be easily proved for our security properties (modulo the use of structural congruence in the case of SBNDC and P BNDC ).
Consider now the the memory cell N h+l x obtained as non-deterministic composition of the cells N h x and N l x of Example 3.7, i.e.,
Since we have already showed that N h x and N l x are both CP BNDC and PP BNDC, by compositionality results we obtain that N h+l x is both CP BNDC and PP BNDC. Notice that the problem of simulating the move N h+l 0 
Compositionality with respect to Refinement
In [8] we introduced a new notion of refinement for SPA processes. Intuitively, an abstract specification (given here as a SPA system) defines the set of possible (allowed) behaviors of a system. Refining a specification corresponds to choosing among these allowed behaviors, the ones that will be actually implemented. The idea is that a refined specification should never show behaviors that were not foreseen in the initial specification. To formalize this idea, we require that (i) each state of the abstract specification is refined to, at most, one state of the more concrete (i.e., refined) specification; (ii) the behavior of the refined states is simulated by the abstract states, i.e., it should always be possible to simulate an action performed by a refined state by the corresponding abstract state, and the two reached states should be still one the refinement of the other. Refinement is formalized as a partial function from processes.
Definition 4.13 (Refinement) A binary relation R ⊆ E × E over processes is a refinement if
• R −1 is a simulation and • R is a partial function from E to E.
We say that E is a refinement of F , denoted by E F , if there exists a refinement R such that R(F ) = E.
The following theorem has been proved in [8] but it is easy to see that it is also a consequence of Theorem 4.3. Just note that any refinement R reflects h → and the reachability relation since, by definition, R −1 is a simulation.
Theorem 4.14 Let W(∼ l , ) be an unwinding class of processes and R be a refinement. If R preserves and ∼ l , then W(∼ l , ) is compositional with respect to R. Example 4.15 Consider the processes M h x and M l x introduced in Example 3.4. We have seen that they are both P BNDC. It is now interesting to study how this property is preserved by further refining the processes. To this aim we apply Theorem 4.14. Notice that neither M h 0 nor M l 0 perform any τ transitions, thus the only condition that we should care about is that the refinement preserves ≈ l B . As a consequence, removing high level actions does not affect the security of the two systems. For example, if we allow the high level user to only reset the cell value to 0 (by removing the w h 1 . M h 1 branch), the resulting process is still P BNDC.
On the other hand, modifications of low behavior should be performed coherently in all equivalent states. For example, the refinement
in which the low level user can reset to 0 the high level cell, only when the cell contains value 1 (notice that in P h 0 no low level write operations are allowed) is not preserving ≈ l B . The LTS of P h 0 is depicted in Figure 6 . It is easy to see that P h 0 ∈ P BNDC . The fact that P h 0 is not P BNDC reveals a slightly subtle information flow due to the fact that a low level user may track the content of the high level cell by trying to reset it: every time the reset succeeds the low level user can conclude that the cell contains value 1. A correct refinement achieving the same low level reset behavior described above, should include the branch w l 0 . P h 0 also in P h 0.
Proof Systems for Unwinding classes
Unwinding conditions are also useful for giving efficient proof techniques. Indeed, we used them to define proof systems which allow us to statically prove that a process is secure, i.e., by just inspecting its syntax [7, 10] . These systems offer a means to build processes which are secure by construction, in an incremental way. They extend the one given in [24] for finite processes, i.e., processes that may only perform finite sequences of actions. In particular, we are able to deal also with recursive processes which may perform unbounded sequences of actions. Here we provide a general scheme for the construction of correct proof rules for unwinding classes of processes which generalize the proof rules proposed in [7, 10] .
) be an unwinding class of processes. Let Sys be a proof system whose rules are of the following form
where W(∼ l , ) is compositional with respect to f , or the rule
Then Sys is correct, i.e., if there exists a derivation of
By Theorem 4.16 and Corollary 4.11 we get for instance the following rule
However, by considering the proof system obtained exploiting only to the operators in Corollary 4.11 we can only prove that the processes in E L are P BNDC , SBNDC , CP BNDC , PP BNDC . In fact, we have no way to introduce high level actions. In the case of P BNDC we have that P BNDC is compositional with respect to the functions of the form f :
where l i ∈ L for all i = 1, . . . , p and h j ∈ H for all j = 1, . . . , q (see also Theorem 5.2). Hence we can add to the proof system the rules of the form
which allows use to build secure processes not in E L . These rules can be used also in the cases of CP BNDC and PP BNDC, while in the case of SBNDC we can prove the correctness of the rule
How to Rectify Insecure Processes
In [6] we propose a general method for rectifying non P BNDC processes. The idea is to automatically transform a process E into a P BNDC process E τ and to identify a large class of processes for which the transformation preserves the low level observational semantics, i.e., for the low level user E and E τ are not distinguishable. This transformation can be used to construct "secure" processes from a first possibly "insecure" definition. Here we generalize the transformation presented in [6] to deal with any unwinding class of processes and sequences s of actions. Given a process E and a sequence of actions s = s 1 . . . s n ∈ Act + , we denote by s.E the process s 1 . . . . .s n .E.
) be an unwinding class of processes compositional with respect to the v-restriction, for each v ⊆ L * , the g-renaming, for each renaming g, the parallel composition operator |, the constant definition def = , the replication operator !. Given a guarded process E and s ∈ Act + with n > 0 we inductively define E s as follows:
where l i ∈ L ∪ {τ }, h j ∈ H, and Z was associated to Z def = F .
Theorem 5.2 (Rectification
) be an unwinding class of processes compositional with respect to the v-restriction, for each v ⊆ L * , the g-renaming, for each renaming g, the parallel composition operator |, the constant definition def = , the replication operator !. Let E ∈ E be a guarded process. If s ∈ Act + is a sequence of actions and such that E s → F implies E F , then E s ∈ W(∼ l , ).
Proof. By induction on E. If E ≡ 0, then E s ≡ 0 ∈ W(∼ l , ). If E ≡ E 1 \v, then by inductive hypothesis on E 1 , E s 1 ∈ W(∼ l , ), hence, since W(∼ l , ) is compositional with respect to the v-restriction, we get the thesis. The cases of renaming, parallel composition, constant definition, and replication are similar. processes.
Definition 5.5 [E s ] Let W(∼ l , ) be an unwinding class of processes compositional with respect to the v-restriction, for each v ⊆ L * , the g-renaming, for each renaming g, the parallel composition operator |, the constant definition def = , the replication operator ! and the nondeterministic choice operator +. Given a process E and s ∈ Act + we inductively define E s as follows:
where l ∈ L ∪ {τ }, h ∈ H, and Z was associated to Z def = F . Theorem 5.6 (Rectification s ) Let W(∼ l , ) be an unwinding class of processes compositional with respect to the v-restriction, for each v ⊆ L * , the g-renaming, for each renaming g, the parallel composition operator |, the constant definition def = , the replication operator !, and the nondeterministic choice operator +. Let E ∈ E be a process. If s ∈ Act + is a sequence of actions and such that E s → F implies E F , then
Proof. The result can be proved by induction on E exploiting the fact that all the unwinding classes are compositional with respect to the low prefix operator.
2
Corollary 5.7 Let E ∈ E be a process.
E τ ∈ CP BNDC , PP BNDC .
Conclusions
In this paper we consider information flow security properties of SPA processes expressed in terms of unwinding conditions. The aim of the present work is to bridge the gap between unwinding conditions and compositionality results. This is done by exploiting a generalized unwinding condition W(∼ l , ), parametric with respect to a low level behavioral equivalence ∼ l and a transition relation . To prove the compositionality of a class of secure processes, expressed as an instance of W(∼ l , ), with respect to an operator f we need to establish connections between the semantics of f and the relations ∼ l and . By instantiating f as one of the algebra operators we rediscover already proved compositionality results (e.g., the compositionality of P BNDC with respect to the parallel operator). Moreover, by instantiating f as a refinement operator, which solves the non-deterministic choices, we obtain results concerning the preservation of the security properties under refinement. Unwinding conditions can be also exploited for defining proof systems which provide efficient techniques for the verification and the development of secure processes. Proof systems allow us to verify whether a process is secure just by inspecting its syntax, and thus avoiding the state-explosion problem. Moreover, they also allow us to build processes which are secure by construction in an incremental way. Finally compositionality of unwinding conditions can be easily exploited to rectify insecure processes.
